NATO Defence Spending: Who Is on Track for 5%

Key takeaways

At the 2025 Hague summit allies committed to spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035: at least 3.5% on core defence and up to 1.5% on related security investment, with annual plans and a 2029 review, NATO says.
NATO says European allies and Canada raised defence spending by nearly 20% in real terms in 2025; Secretary General Mark Rutte put the extra investment in 2025 and 2026 combined at $258 billion.
The International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn groups allies by pace: Estonia and Lithuania lead, Belgium, France and Italy are “stressed,” and Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain are “reluctant.”
The Congressional Research Service reports U.S. plans to withdraw at least 9,000 troops from Europe, and the Pentagon has said U.S. contributions could depend on allies meeting spending targets.

NATO’s defence spending debate has moved from whether allies reach 2% of GDP to whether they can reach 5% within a decade. Official figures show a sharp rise since 2024, but independent analysts say progress is uneven, and the United States has linked its own posture in Europe to allied spending. This report sets out the target, the numbers from NATO and independent analysts, and the open questions. We rely on NATO’s own publications, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and a Tallinn think tank; classifications of individual countries are the think tank’s, not NATO’s.

The target and what counts

According to NATO, allies agreed at the 2025 summit in The Hague to invest 5% of GDP annually on defence by 2035, made up of at least 3.5% for core defence requirements, with annual plans showing a “credible, incremental path,” and up to 1.5% on broader defence- and security-related investment such as critical infrastructure, cyber defence, resilience and the defence industrial base. The trajectory will be reviewed in 2029. CRS adds that allies agreed contributions to Ukraine’s defence count toward the goal. NATO says European allies and Canada raised their combined defence expenditure by nearly 20% in real terms in 2025, by more than $90 billion in 2021 prices, bringing it to 2.3% of combined GDP and more than $571 billion.

What Rutte says

In a speech at the Ditchley Foundation on September 16, Rutte said that looking at 2025 and 2026 together, European allies and Canada are adding $258 billion in extra investment, that allies announced more than $50 billion in new procurements at the July summit in Ankara, and that eight of NATO’s nine forward land forces are led by European allies or Canada. He described a “NATO 3.0” with a stronger Europe in a stronger alliance, and said European allies and Canada are “on a trajectory to equalise their defence spending with the United States.” He also credited President Trump for pushing on spending. Those are the Secretary General’s characterizations of the trend.

Who leads and who lags

The International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) wrote on September 14 that all 32 allies except Slovenia are expected to reach 2% in 2026, with 10 only barely above it. It sorts allies into five groups according to their announced plans. The “top performers,” Estonia and Lithuania, plan to spend 5% or more on core defence from 2026. “Fast-track” allies aim to meet targets well before 2035: Denmark (2030), Germany (2029), Latvia (2027), Poland (2027), Sweden (2030) and Türkiye (2030). A “baseline” group of 16 plans to hit 5% by 2035, though few have published financing roadmaps; the ICDS places Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States there. Belgium, France and Italy are “stressed,” which the author attributes to high debt and deficits, and Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain are “reluctant,” having declined to aim for 5%. The author wrote that perceived threat tracks commitment, producing a north-east to south-west divide in Europe. Poland, the ICDS noted, expects to raise its defence budget from 2.19% to 4.68% over five years.

CRS reported that Rutte acknowledged in June that Czechia, Hungary and Slovenia may fall below 2% this year and that Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom lacked plans to meet the new targets. Hungary’s prime minister has since promised to join the group planning for 5%, the ICDS noted. Spain is heading to a snap election on Nov. 29, and its government has not said what it will do on spending in the reporting we reviewed.

The U.S. side of the bargain

CRS reported that about 86,000 U.S. personnel were assigned or deployed to NATO countries in Europe as of March 2026, and that since October 2025 the Administration has announced plans to withdraw at least 9,000, and possibly up to 13,000, U.S. troops over the next year, including a rotational brigade in Romania and about 5,000 from Germany. President Trump separately said on May 21 he would send 5,000 more troops to Poland. According to CRS, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said in June that U.S. posture and contributions could be “contingent on other countries meeting their defense spending targets,” and that the U.S. would scale back its contributions to the NATO Force Model; Rutte acknowledged an adjustment while saying other allies have stepped up. Congress set a floor of 76,000 U.S. troops in Europe in the FY2026 defence authorization unless it is first consulted. CRS also reported that some European governments question U.S. reliability after the Administration’s Greenland remarks and the Iran war, and that the 2026 National Defense Strategy says Europe should take “primary responsibility” for its conventional defence.

Why it matters

Spending decides what the alliance can field. CRS reported that NATO officials have expressed concern about low munitions stockpiles and that Rutte has called for a 400% increase in allied air-defence capability. Our reports on the Patriot interceptor shortage, and German aid to Ukraine show how supply limits, not only budgets, shape outcomes. The Russian threat is also a driver: our coverage includes Russian hybrid operations against the EU and NATO.

What remains unclear

Allies have promised annual plans, but few have published financing details, and the ICDS warned that some “baseline” allies could slip into the stressed group as 2035 approaches. NATO’s 2029 review could change the balance between core and related spending. The U.S. six-month review of force posture in Europe, announced in June, is due to conclude around the end of the year, according to CRS.

NATO 5% Spending Goal: Which Allies Are on Track by 2035