U.S. and Nine Partners Sign San Francisco Declaration to Safeguard AI Supply Chains

The United States and nine partners signed the San Francisco Declaration on Nov. 15, 2026, defining AI supply-chain technologies as a shared security concern.

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Featured image: the 23rd Street entrance of the U.S. Department of State’s Harry S. Truman Building in Washington, in a May 2024 file photo. Official State Department photo by Linda D. Epstein. Photo: U.S. Department of State, Wikimedia Commons, public domain. Cropped to 16:9.

The United States and nine partner governments signed the San Francisco Declaration on Sunday, Nov. 15, 2026, stating that the sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure in AI supply chains are a shared national-security concern. The State Department said the signing took place at a Pax Silica Founders Retreat convened by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg.

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10
Governments named as signatories of the San Francisco Declaration, including the United States
5
Proposed working groups the declaration says the participants resolved to establish
Dec. 12, 2025
Date the State Department said Helberg convened the inaugural Pax Silica Summit
7 of 8
Inaugural partner countries, excluding the United States, that were also among Sunday’s signatories

Figures are from the State Department’s Nov. 15, 2026, release on the San Francisco Declaration and its Dec. 11, 2025, release on the inaugural summit. The 7-of-8 figure is a Boston Report count from those two official lists.

What the San Francisco Declaration says

The State Department released the full text of the declaration and said it was issued by the governments of the United States, Australia, India, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Qatar, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. The department described Pax Silica as entering “a new phase” less than a year after its launch, and it framed the document as a “common baseline” and “a path to act on it.”

The text says economic security is “fundamental to national security.” It sets out a “common understanding” of two foundations. The first is “sensitive technologies,” including goods, software, materials, knowledge, components and the means of production “essential to SI supply chains,” whose theft, illicit transfer or acquisition by “hostile actors” would confer a “meaningful military or intelligence advantage, or undue economic leverage,” or whose unauthorized transfer or misuse could pose “significant risks” to the participants’ economic and national security. The second is “critical infrastructure,” including the physical and digital systems that underpin those supply chains, such as ports, terminals, transport, communications and logistics networks, information and communications technology and energy infrastructure, and the digital platforms used to coordinate them.

A footnote in the official text says that for some participants, “super intelligence,” abbreviated as SI, “refers to ‘artificial intelligence.’” The Boston Report is using the department’s wording when quoting the document and is treating the declaration as a statement about AI and related supply chains, not as a finding that “super intelligence” systems already exist.

The signatories “affirm that the safeguarding of these sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure is a shared endeavor.” They also reaffirm, the text says, “the importance of cooperation on the enforcement of our respective policies to protect sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure from undue access, influence, or control, as stated in the Pax Silica Declaration.” Sunday’s document does not itself create new U.S. export controls. It is a political declaration about how the participants say they will cooperate, not a statute, a sanctions list or a published schedule of new licensing rules.

Who signed, and how that compares with the first Pax Silica summit

Several of Sunday’s signatories sit in the Asia-Pacific, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Singapore and India. Israel, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were also named, as was the United Kingdom.

The department’s Dec. 11, 2025, release on the inaugural Pax Silica Summit said Helberg convened that meeting on Dec. 12, 2025, with counterparts from eight countries: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, the Netherlands, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and Australia. Guest contributions came from Taiwan, the European Union, Canada and the OECD, that release said. The United States hosted the meeting.

A Boston Report comparison of those two official lists shows that seven of the eight inaugural partner countries were among Sunday’s signatories, or 87.5%. The Netherlands was named as an inaugural participating country and was not listed among Sunday’s signatories. India and Qatar, which were not named as participating countries at the inaugural summit, were among the nine non-U.S. governments that signed on Nov. 15. Both countries are listed as signatories of the earlier Pax Silica Declaration on the State Department’s current Pax Silica page, so their absence from the December 2025 partner list should not be read as a finding that they only became involved on Sunday.

Bar chart comparing official country lists for the San Francisco Declaration and the first Pax Silica summit: 7 countries appear on both lists, the Netherlands appears only on the inaugural partner list, and India and Qatar appear among Sunday’s non-U.S. signatories but not on the inaugural partner list
Sources: U.S. State Department, “Pax Silica Summit,” Dec. 11, 2025, and “The San Francisco Declaration on the Secure Foundations of Enduring Prosperity,” Nov. 15, 2026. The United States hosted the inaugural summit and signed on Nov. 15; it is omitted from the bars. The seven countries on both lists are Australia, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. This is not a chart of current Pax Silica membership. Chart: The Boston Report.

The current State Department Pax Silica page lists a larger group of signatories to the earlier Pax Silica Declaration, including the European Union, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and others, and it lists Taiwan as a non-signatory participant that endorsed the declaration’s principles through a separate joint statement. That wider roster and Sunday’s 10-government signing are not the same list, and the Boston Report is not treating the Nov. 15 event as a count of current Pax Silica membership.

The five working groups the governments proposed

The declaration says the participants are “resolved to establish working groups among us to give effect to our shared vision of super intelligence (SI)-led growth and economic security.” The State Department’s accompanying statement said those groups are proposed, not that they have already been stood up or given public charters, budgets or deadlines. The five topics listed are:

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  • pro-innovation policy frameworks;
  • SI adoption in key sectors;
  • supply chain cooperation across the SI stack;
  • safe harbors and supply chain security hubs; and
  • SI security and resilience.

The original Pax Silica Declaration, as published on the department’s Pax Silica page, already described a supply-chain agenda that runs from software and frontier models through “compute and semiconductors,” advanced manufacturing, logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy. Sunday’s text is narrower in one respect: it is a signed statement defining what the 10 governments say should be protected and committing them to work through those proposed groups. It does not name specific companies, mines, chip plants, cables or data centers, and it does not announce a new joint fund or a list of banned entities.

That official language sits against a year of separate U.S. measures on advanced chips and manufacturing that The Boston Report has already covered, including U.S. chip export controls on China and a map of new U.S. chip plants. Those earlier reports document existing U.S. policy. They are not part of the San Francisco Declaration, and Sunday’s text does not say that it amends those rules.

What the text does not decide

The declaration released on Sunday does not name China, or any other country, as an adversary. It refers to “hostile actors,” “economic coercion,” “non-market policies and practices” and “undue access, influence, or control.” The department’s December 2025 inaugural-summit release used a similar formulation, saying participants had affirmed a commitment to protect sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure “from undue access or control by countries of concern.” Those are the official phrases. The Boston Report is not reading a target country into the Nov. 15 text that the text itself does not name.

Anadolu Agency, citing the Financial Times, reported on Nov. 16 that Helberg said Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the European Commission were expected to sign the declaration the following week. The State Department’s own Nov. 15 release does not include that forecast. The Boston Report has not independently confirmed those additional signatures and is reporting them as an account attributed to Helberg by the Financial Times, as relayed by Anadolu Agency.

The declaration is the latest official move in a wider global AI race over who controls the infrastructure behind advanced models. It is a statement of common definitions and intended follow-up work. Whether the proposed working groups produce public rules, joint projects or only further communiqués will depend on what the 10 governments, and any later signatories, actually publish next.

Sources

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