Russia War Crimes in Ukraine: UN, ICC and OSCE Findings

Key takeaways

The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded in March 2026 that Russian authorities committed crimes against humanity through the deportation and forcible transfer of children and their enforced disappearance. It verified 1,205 children; about 80 percent of those in documented cases had not been returned.
The UN human rights monitoring mission verified 2,222 civilians killed and 13,058 injured in Ukraine from January to August 2026, 55 percent more than in the same period of 2025. Most casualties from long-range weapons occurred far from the front line.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued six arrest warrants in the Ukraine situation. These are warrants, not convictions; no suspect is in custody, and Russia, which is not an ICC member, rejects them.
The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression is not yet operating. Russia’s foreign minister has called it a “sham” and says the ICC runs “political hit jobs”; Moscow calls the Bucha events a staged fabrication.

More than four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a series of international bodies have published findings on alleged violations of the laws of war. They differ in mandate and in the standard of proof they apply: a UN commission of inquiry reaches conclusions about crimes, a monitoring mission verifies casualty figures, and a court issues warrants when judges find “reasonable grounds to believe” that a suspect is responsible. None of this is a criminal verdict. This report sets out what each body has documented, in its own terms, alongside the position of the Russian government, and then what remains unresolved.

Timeline of key findings and decisions

24 February 2022: Russia launches its full-scale invasion. The ICC Prosecutor opens an investigation on 2 March 2022 after referrals from 43 states, the ICC says.
4 March 2022: The UN Human Rights Council creates the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (resolution 49/1), now made up of Erik Møse (chair), Pablo de Greiff and Vrinda Grover.
December 2022: The UN human rights office (OHCHR) reports on killings of civilians in the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions (see Bucha below).
17 March 2023: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issues arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of children.
5 March and 24 June 2024: Warrants follow for Sergei Kobylash and Viktor Sokolov, and for Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged strikes on Ukrainian electrical infrastructure.
1 January 2025: The Rome Statute enters into force for Ukraine, which deposited its ratification on 25 October 2024, according to the ICC.
8-12 October 2025: Putin visits Tajikistan, an ICC member; on 19 March 2026 the court finds Tajikistan failed to comply with its request to arrest him and refers the matter to the Assembly of States Parties.
12 March 2026: The Commission of Inquiry publishes its report on children, enforced disappearance and trials.
15 May 2026: The Council of Europe adopts the agreement that creates the management committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression.
9 July 2026: OSCE experts present a Moscow Mechanism report on the militarization and indoctrination of Ukrainian children.
15 July 2026: The OSCE human rights office (ODIHR) publishes its ninth interim report on violations in Ukraine.
16 September to 2 October 2026: OHCHR publishes its August casualty update, and the UN human rights chief briefs the Human Rights Council.

Attacks on civilians: the verified figures

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) verifies civilian casualties individually, using a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard, and says the true totals are likely higher. In its update for August 2026, published on 16 September, it verified at least 372 civilians killed and 2,349 injured that month, the second-highest monthly figure of the year after July (448 killed, 2,675 injured). For January to August it verified 2,222 killed and 13,058 injured, which it said was 55 percent higher than the same period of 2025 and more than double the same period of 2024. Long-range missiles and drones caused 47 percent of August casualties, and short-range drones were the main cause near the front line. In preliminary figures, the mission recorded at least 200 civilians killed and 1,234 injured from 1 to 24 September.

UN human rights chief Volker Türk told the Human Rights Council that glide bombs killed and injured nearly 2,500 civilians in the first eight months of the year, 62 percent more than a year earlier, and that attacks on energy infrastructure and commercial property had “increased sharply, in clear disregard of international humanitarian law.” The OSCE’s ODIHR reported on 15 July that verified civilian casualties in government-controlled areas from December 2025 to May 2026 were 45 percent higher than a year earlier, that May was the deadliest month for civilians since April 2022, and that Russian forces ran a systematic campaign against Ukraine’s energy system over the winter. Our reporting on individual strikes includes the Kramatorsk bus strike, the Zaporizhzhia glide bomb attack and an explainer on Russian glide bombs.

Both bodies also record harm in Russia and in occupied areas. HRMMU said Russian authorities reported 113 people killed and 736 injured inside Russia in August, and larger numbers in occupied territory, but that it could not verify most of those claims because it lacks access. Türk said Ukrainian forces had reportedly struck logistics centres and oil refineries inside Russia.

Killings, torture and sexual violence

OHCHR’s December 2022 thematic report documented 441 civilians killed in the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions between 24 February and 6 April 2022, including summary executions, and in Bucha it documented 73 killings while corroborating further allegations, according to the report’s summary. The Commission of Inquiry reached its own findings that Russian forces committed summary executions, unlawful confinement, torture, rape and sexual violence in occupied areas. Russia’s UN ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, said on 10 June 2026 that the Bucha events “bear all the hallmarks of a cynically staged fabrication,” that bodies were arranged after Russian troops withdrew, and that OHCHR relied on an unverified Ukrainian police source and refused Russia’s request to share its underlying material.

In his September update, Türk said OHCHR had documented more than 1,000 cases of sexual violence, of which 89 percent were attributed to Russian authorities and 11 percent to Ukraine, and that Russia was using these acts “to torture, intimidate and coerce.” Nebenzia has said Russia completely rejects such findings, that its military has a strict code of conduct, and that Russian prisoners of war face sexual violence in Ukrainian custody. OHCHR has also reported that Ukrainian authorities mistreated Russian prisoners, mainly during transit, according to a summary of its reporting we reviewed only in excerpt.

Deported children and enforced disappearance

This is the area where the UN commission has gone furthest. In its 12 March 2026 report, it concluded that Russian authorities committed the crimes against humanity of deportation and forcible transfer of children, and of their enforced disappearance, and the war crime of unjustifiable delay in repatriating civilians. It verified 1,205 children moved from five regions; 80 percent of those in the documented cases had not been returned. It said Russia placed children with families or institutions in 21 regions, granted them Russian citizenship and listed some on adoption databases, and that the policy was conceived and carried out at the highest level, with the involvement of Putin and Lvova-Belova “visible from the outset.”

Russian officials have described the early relocations as evacuations for safety, which the commission said it rejected because evacuations may only be temporary. Moscow has called the ICC warrants over the children “outrageous” and legally void. Ukrainian officials say 20,651 children have been verified as deported or forcibly displaced, and Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab has estimated the true number is at least 35,000; Ukraine says 2,665 have been returned. We reviewed those three figures only in secondary reporting, and they have not been confirmed by a court. OSCE experts also presented a report on 9 July on the militarization and indoctrination of Ukrainian children; we did not review its full findings.

The commission also found that courts in Russia and occupied Ukraine denied civilians and prisoners of war fair trial rights, and said it documented violations by Ukraine too, including irregularities in mobilization and an overbroad definition of “collaborative activities” in Ukrainian law. According to a statement by a UN official as summarized in reporting we reviewed only in excerpt, OHCHR has verified 129 executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war and 48 deaths in Russian custody.

The ICC warrants: what they say and do not say

The ICC’s pre-trial judges found reasonable grounds to believe that Putin and Lvova-Belova bear responsibility for the war crimes of unlawful deportation and unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas, allegedly from at least 24 February 2022. For Kobylash, Sokolov, Shoigu and Gerasimov, the judges found reasonable grounds to believe they are responsible for directing attacks at civilian objects, causing excessive incidental harm, and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts, over missile strikes on the electricity grid from at least 10 October 2022 to at least 9 March 2023. These are allegations tested only to the standard needed for a warrant; the suspects have not been tried. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in 2024 that Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute and “we do not recognize this.”

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on 15 September 2026 that the ICC’s Ukraine investigation is directed “exclusively at Russia” and that its proceedings amount to a “hit job.” He argued that the court has no jurisdiction over a non-member and noted a reservation he said Ukraine made on ratification excluding certain war crimes by its nationals for eight years; we have not independently checked that point. Lavrov also called the tribunal and the Register of Damage “entirely illegitimate initiatives.”

What accountability exists, and what does not

The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine would prosecute senior leaders for the decision to use force, a crime the ICC cannot currently prosecute against Russian leaders because Russia is not a member. The Council of Europe and Ukraine signed the founding agreement in June 2025, and 38 states and the European Union have said they intend to join the management arrangement, according to the Council of Europe, whose entry into force is still pending national procedures. JusticeInfo reported that a final budget has not been drawn up, that the EU has committed 10 million euros for an advance team over 24 months, and that the Council hopes to finish budget scoping by early 2027. Lavrov called the tribunal a “sham” and said only the UN Security Council can determine aggression.

The Register of Damage for Ukraine has opened all its claim categories, according to the Council of Europe, but a separate claims commission convention still needs more ratifications before it can decide compensation, based on a summary we reviewed in excerpt. Inside Ukraine, prosecutors had registered more than 220,000 war-crime cases as of April 2026, according to a Ukrainian Bar Association summary we saw only in excerpt.

Why it matters

The findings bear on sanctions, peace-talk terms and future trials. UN human rights chief Türk urged a push toward negotiations built on confidence-building steps, including an end to attacks on energy infrastructure and a full prisoner exchange. Our coverage of the diplomacy includes the Ukraine peace talks in Miami.

What remains unresolved

No court has convicted a Russian official of these alleged crimes; the tribunal lacks a budget and a bench; and Russia rejects every one of these mechanisms. Casualty figures from occupied territory and from inside Russia cannot be independently verified. Courts, not commissions, will ultimately decide individual guilt.

Russia War Crimes in Ukraine: What the UN, ICC and OSCE Have Documented